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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Daniel A. Stanton, Appellant/Petitioner herein {"Stanton,r), readopts his original
statement of the ease and statement of facts as set forth in his petition ("Petition")

at pp.

2-8. Stanton objects to the statement of the case set forth in the brief in oppositon {"Brief")
filed by Dale Anderson, Appellee/Respondent herein ("Anderson"), to the extent it omits
a n d / o r misstates material facts necessary for this Court to reach an equitable determination of the sole issue presented for review, that of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Specifically, Anderson's statement of the case (Brief, at 10) fails, inter alia, to state
the fact that this case was ordered dismissed by the District Court for cause on 31 August
1990, or eight (8) months after first being filed on 22 December 1989. It misstates the date

ii

of trial as being 14 November 1995, when in fact trial was held earlier on 2 October 1995.
However, the date of the ex parte "ORDER (duplicate)" prepared by Anderson's counsel
and subsequently signed by District Judge Rigtrup was 14 November 1994.
Moreover, this case was not filed by "Appellant/ 7 as is confusingly misstated at the
outset, nor is "Appellee" (Dale Anderson) a licensed attorney in this state.
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The gravamen of Stanton's petition for a writ of certiorari is based upon the simple,,
singular issue of whether this case ceased to exist from on and after 24 August 1990
following its involuntary dismissal ordered by the District Court for cause, and dated and
filed as such on 31 August 1990.1 Then and thereafter the burden was plainly incumbent
upon Anderson to prove that his case was timely, and properly, reinstated pursuant to the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and particularly in the face of being squarely challenged on
that point at every stage of the proceedings.
Anderson has never done so at any time since, and nothing contained in the record
of this case nor in his instant Brief opposing this Petition establishes to the contrary, with
legal sufficiency of evidence, to overcome the jurisdictional issue stemming from the
existence of that dismissal order which can no longer continue to be brushed aside.
Nevertheless, Appellee Anderson merely continues to reiterate the procedural and
judicial advantages of invited error which resulted from on and after 14 November 1994 —
some four years and three months after that dismissal order had been filed — when his

1

^ePetition Appendix, Exhibits no. 5 and 6, respectively evidencing the order to
show cause, dated 17 July 1990, and the order of dismissal, dated 31 August 1990.
-1-

counsel. Attorney David C Anderson, somehow managed to obtain Judge Rigtrup's
signature on the self-prepared, ex parte "ORDER (duplicate)''' of even date 2 which gave
rise to the jurisdictional issue now earnestly sought to be reviewed by this Court.
At no place in his Brief is that order of dismissal squarely addressed in relation to
such conclusive evidence, the existence of which clearly operated to deprive the trial court
of jurisdiction of the cause as well as over the person of Stanton. And because it is equally
clear that the jurisdictional issue did not arise until after that invited error was effected, it
misconstrues the facts for Anderson to state that Stanton's original answer at the time the
case was tiled, *'...[d]id not raise jurisdiction/' ^ This can only imply that Anderson also
considers moot Stanton's jurisdictional argument which arose from the dismissal order.
As the invited error in this case has thus far resulted in not only procedural, but
substantia!, due process violations and a gross miscarriage of justice,, it is appropriate to
review this Court's denunciation of invited error for at least fifty years. For example, in
Hehnan v. Vaierson, 121 Utah 332, 241 P.2d 910, 913 (1952), this Court said:
"In the case of Ludlow v» Colorado Animal By-Products Company 104 Utah
221,137 P 2d 345, 347 (1943), we said: 'A party who takes a position which
either leads a court into error or by conduct approves the error committed by
the court, cannot later take advantage of such error in procedure'../\
More recently, in West Gallery Corp. v. Salt Lake City B£ o/Com'rs.,

537 R2d 1027,1028

(Utah, 1975), the statement of this Court was equally analogous to the facts of this case:
"The suggestion of mootness on the part of the City is mute evidence that it
has attempted to shift its own abortive procedures onto the shoulders of the
District Court,../'.

~ See Petition Appendix, Exhibit no. 7,
3

Brief, VIII. Statement of Case, opening paragraph, at 10>
-2-

In this case, the similarly abortive procedures resulting from the invited error
effected by Attorney Anderson's 14 November 1994 "ORDER (duplicate)/ 7 were carefully
calculated to produce the circumstances which presently exist. Indeed, the very existence
of that "ORDER (duplicate)" itself provides credible evidence of the fact that Anderson
knew his case had never been properly reinstituted or there would have been no need for
its languge stating: "...[t]he prior order of the court is set aside../ 7 . But even so, it makes
no statement that such "prior order" was, in fact, the order of dismissal of 31 August 1990,
much less how that order of dismissal could be "set aside" so long after the applicable
statutes of limitation had run. Of equal importance is the question whether the District
Court even had jurisdiction to execute Anderson's "ORDER (duplicate)" at all where the
operative effect of the dismissal itself served to divest the court of jurisdiction of the cause
more than four years earlier. How that problem was overcome is not stated.
Anderson elsewhere takes issue with Stanton's citing of TJtompson v. Jfickson, 743
R2d 1230 (UtCt. App., 1987) as a singular case demonstrating the consequences of a court's
action taken in the absence of jurisdiction and argues, unconvincingly, that the facts in this
case are "...[n]ot the same point as the Thompson case." 4 Under this ill-founded theory,
neither could divorce cases, for example, be cited as precedent for jurisdiction in cases
unrelated to divorce, either, as is common practice in the rendering of judicial opinions.
A brief examination reveals that this is so. In Van Per Stappen v. Van

DerStappen,

815 R2d 1335,1337 ( U t C t App., 1991), for example, the court said: "...a judgment is void
when entered by a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy, and

4

Brief, paragraphs 4-6, at 12.
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must be set aside under Utah R.Civ.R 60(b)(5)/' citing, State Pepf of Social Sews, v. Vijil,
784 R2d 1130, 1132 (Utah, 1989). In Rimensburger v. Rimensburger.

841 P.2d 709, 710

( U t C t A p p v 1992), the court again said: "The question of whether a court has subject
matter jurisdiction 'goes to the very power of a court to entertain an action/ Curtis v.
Curtis. 789 P.2d 717, 726 ( U t C t App v 1990). Consequently, we review this question of law
independently and do not defer to the trial court/ 7 citing Barlow v. Cappa, 821 P.2d 465,
466 ( U t C t A p p v 1991), and Van Per Siappen, supra.

Thus, as Tfiompson, supra, was

sufficient, and particularly appropriate, to cite for authority relating to the determination
of jurisdictional issues, such as are presented here, Anderson's argument has no merit.
Anderson also argues, misleadingly, concerning Stanton's request for Rule 11
sanctions stating, in pertinent part, that:
"He [Stanton] appears to argue that even though the trial court denied Ms
argument to dismiss on three separate occasions, and the Court of Appeals
also denied relief, that Appellee's counsel should determine that the courts
were in error and dismiss the complaint regardless of what his client
desired/' 5
To the contrary, Stanton seeks sanctions against Anderson's counsel not for the
reasons just cited, but for the ultimate results effected over the course of a full decade by
means of Counsel's material acts and omissions and plain invited error, the facts of which
are self-evident throughout Stanton's Petition and summarized at page 17 thereof.
CONCLUSION
Because legal effect of the order of dismissal by the District Court, duly entered in
the record on 31 August 1990, clearly operated to existinguish the existence of Anderson's

5

Brief, paragraph 12, at 13.
-4-

case absent some timely action by him to properly reinstate it, and because this case was
only // reinstituted // by means of the invited error of Anderson's counsel in unconscionably
obtaining, ex parte, the services of the District Court more than four years later by "shifting
[his] own abortive procedures onto its shoulders/' and because Anderson's counsel's
"ORDER (duplicate)" of 14 November 1994 constitutes credible evidence that he plainly
knew that his client's case had been so dismissed as a result of his own dilatory conduct,
and because of the amazing fact that no less than three courts and seven judges below
during the course of the past decade have thus far failed to give cognizance to the
fundamental issue of subject matter jurisdiction in this case, and because jurisdiction is
absolutely and unequivocally essential to a court's power to act, these are, indeed (contrary
to Anderson's assertion), "special and important reasons presented in the petition for the
granting of the writ"
THEREFORE AND ACCORDINGLY, Stanton hereby respectfully requests that his
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari be granted in the good-faith belief that there yet remains
one Court within the entire State of Utah that will finally understand the subject-matter
jurisdiction issue in this case. For, as the U. S. Supreme Court stated 200 years ago:
"No Court in America ever yet thought, nor, I hope, ever Hill, of acquiring
jurisdiction by fiction. ...It is evident that we are not to assume a voluntary
jurisdiction, because we think, or others may think, it may be exercised
innocently, or even wisely. The court is not to fix the bounds of its own
jurisdiction,, according to its own discretion. A jurisdiction assumed without
authority, would be equally an usurpation, whether exercised wisely, or
unwisely/' Maxfield^Lessee
v. Levy. (I), 4 DalL (U.S.) 308, 311-12 (1797).
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the 19th day of June, 200(1

inJ^pp^lIarit/Petitioner
-5-
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